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ABSTRACT 
LANGNER, ERIC R. Do Structured Products Increase Social Welfare? Department of   
Economics, June 2012 
ADVISOR: Tomas Dvorak 
 
Structured products are a rapidly growing type of financial engineering 
which allow firms to design solutions to meet the individual needs of investors. A 
structured product is a contract between a financial firm and its client. It involves 
packaging together traditional and exotic securities, commodities, and options 
generating a defined payout structure for the client. I ask whether these products 
enhance social welfare. I argue that, on balance, structured products increase 
social welfare. I find that while the products are complicated, they are not 
designed to hide risks nor are they likely to be a source of financial fragility. 
Rather, structured products mobilize savings, channel savings towards productive 
investments and distribute risk to those most willing and able to bear them. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
   INTRODUCTION 
Financial innovation has the potential to lower transaction costs and improve 
social welfare on a global scale. Unfortunately, financial innovation is also prone to 
asymmetric information, hidden risk, and inefficiency which have the potential to cause 
global economic downturns. Because the wounds of the recent financial crisis are so 
fresh, the popular press has been highly critical of financial engineering and the dangers 
it poses. That being said, many of the most valuable core aspects of today’s developed 
financial markets were at one time risky financial innovation. Stock options, ATM 
machines, and credit cards were all novel ideas when they were introduced to investors 
and consumers. Only over time and experience have they proven their worth to financial 
markets. As much as investors are wary of financial innovation, it is difficult to discern 
whether a product will be as valuable as the advent of credit cards, or as destructive as the 
securitization of mortgages. 
 The niche of financial engineering known as structured products is a perfect 
example of financial innovation, and the field has been growing rapidly in recent years. 
Structured products are designed to meet investment needs which can’t be met elsewhere 
in the market. Whether that need is principal protection, increased leverage, or another 
unique market outlook, financial engineers have a wide variety of tools at their disposal 
to create the product they need. The simplest products may involve only basic stock 
options, while the more complicated can involve exotic futures, swaps, and other 
derivatives. Much of the value added by financial engineers comes from taking these 
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complicated derivatives and wrapping them into a simple product with a defined payout 
structure. If structured products sound complicated and confusing, that’s because they 
are. This intrinsic complexity is the subject of much of the criticism of the industry. For 
that reason, much of this paper will be devoted to exploring specific structured products 
by way of two case studies.  
 While the market for structured products is small when compared to overall 
financial markets, the industry has been growing exponentially and functions as a 
significant means of financing for issuing firms. According to Structured Products Daily, 
over $50 billion worth of structured products were issued in the U.S. in the first nine 
months of 2011 alone. David Bergstresser’s The Retail Market for Structured Notes 
(2008) claims that $4.4 trillion Euros worth of structured products were outstanding in 
2006, comparable to the amount of money traded in the foreign exchange market on a 
daily basis. Individual structured products sometimes bring in tens of millions of dollars 
to issuing firms, who use structured products as a financing alternative to traditional debt 
issuance. All structured products involve investors lending capital to the issuing firm, to 
be returned in some form at maturity based on the performance of any number of 
underlying stocks, commodities, or indices. This exchange of capital highlights one of the 
most important roles of highly developed financial markets. By lending capital to the 
issuer in exchange for periodic payments, investors are demonstrating that the issuer has 
a more productive use for the capital than they do. If the investors felt they could earn 
higher returns than the rate they expect to receive from the note in an equally risky 
investment, they would place their money elsewhere. On the scale of an entire economy, 
this increases growth in the long run.  
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 A major barrier to the growth of the structured products market is the strategic 
complexity of the products, which leads to skepticism and market avoidance on the part 
of potential investors. It is important to note that while structured products are complex 
and potentially risky for the investor, the issuing firm typically faces little or no risk. The 
nature of these notes is not for financial firms to express market opinions. Rather, expert 
traders hedge the risk which accompanies notes on an ongoing basis in order to limit and 
ideally prevent market exposure. While this paper won’t delve into hedging specifically, 
the process requires experienced and quantitative traders to monitor the status of notes on 
an ongoing basis. Accordingly, commissions for structured product deals are higher than 
for most other financial products or services. 
Financial engineering, including structured products, has become a target in the 
wake of the financial crisis. Some of the biggest players in financial markets, notably 
former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, have criticized financial innovation as Wall Street 
creations which accomplish little or no good in financial markets or society at large. Gary 
Weiss’s Wall Street Versus America: The Rampant Greed and Dishonesty That Imperil 
Your Investments (2006) is as scathingly critical of the industry as the title would suggest, 
depicting Wall Street as selfish, corrupt, and under-regulated. The highly publicized 
‘Occupy Wall Street’ movement rallied around a belief in malevolent financial engineers, 
and the movement earned sympathy from those who lost significant wealth when the 
housing bubble burst. One particular accusation against financial engineering is that 
products deliberately cater towards investors irrational desires for risk, particularly an 
irrational desire to hold “riskless” products. In Gennaioli’s “Financial Innovation and 
Financial Fragility” (2010), he focuses specifically on the neglect of unlikely “tail” risk, 
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and the high demand for products with safe cash flows. He goes on to highlight a pattern 
which has been all too common in financial history. First, new products are created to 
serve as improved, safer versions of traditional securities (i.e. AAA tranches of debt 
obligations). The new securities are issued in great volumes, until a market event or news 
story exposes previously misunderstood risk embedded in the new securities. A mass 
exodus from the new product ensues, and investors flood the market for more traditional 
safe securities. If the market for the product was allowed to grow to global proportions, a 
worldwide recession can ensue as was the case in 2008. Throughout history, financial 
innovation has posed a variety of threats to global markets. Regardless of the specific 
innovation, issues such information asymmetry, illiquidity, and misunderstood risk 
consistently cause problems. While information asymmetry can be problematic, I argue 
that it exists based on the quantitative nature of structured products rather than by 
deliberate design. Furthermore, research shows that it is in the best interest of the issuing 
firms to remove information problems in order to increase issuance. 
While much of the recent literature regarding financial innovation has focused on 
mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, structured products have 
also been a target of many financial innovation opponents. Due to the complexity of the 
structuring process, there have been examples of structured products that were sold at a 
6% commission, even though the note was designed to expire in a mere six months. 
Because commissions are frequently woven into the options structure of the product, the 
retail investor probably didn’t realize the terms were so unfavorable. As discussed in 
Bergstresser (2008), the majority of the instances of excessive commissions occurred in 
the early 2000’s when the market was small, illiquid, and opaque. Regardless, the 
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commissions for structured products are still frequently disguised in product structure to 
this day. While the market for these products has grown in both volume and number of 
participants, it is not impossible to imagine such a similar case arising in the future. 
The other major criticism of structured products is that they are deliberately 
designed to be complex in order to generate large commissions for financial firms. 
Bergstresser (2008) makes the obvious statement that “extreme complexity can make it 
difficult for investors to understand the true price they are paying.” Retail investors, 
rather than institutions or hedge funds, are far more likely to fall victim to complexity 
because they are less likely to understand the mechanics behind a structured product. 
However, it is potentially in the best interest of financial engineers to remove or limit 
complexity. While problems with asymmetric information have indeed hurt investors in 
the past, there have also been examples of the asymmetry leading to market 
disappearance. Depending on the type of economic theory being applied to the problems 
of information, the argument can be approached logically by both sides. Overall, 
complexity is certainly a valid concern when dealing with structured products, whether it 
is intrinsic or fabricated. 
Despite the pitfalls described above, structured products have the potential to 
significantly improve social welfare. The primary draw of the industry is that financial 
engineers can offer solutions to investors which don’t exist in the traditional financial 
market. Of the two products which will be examined in this paper, one allows the 
investor to extract income from a neutral outlook on Alcoa’s stock growth, while the 
other offers leveraged upside exposure to the S&P 500 without any type of leveraged 
downside. The demand for these products comes from investors who possess a 
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complicated, obscure, or specific market view but have been unable to find an 
appropriate solution in the traditional market. By packaging existing products together, 
structured product issuers are able to provide a single product which addresses their 
needs. This situation highlights the dual role of structured products issuers as both 
structurers and as a type of financial advisor who offers products designed to meet needs 
and fit into an existing portfolio. Robert Shiller’s new book, Finance and the Good 
Society (2012), calls for more investment in financial innovation in order for society to 
achieve its goals. Finance and the Good Society illustrates how financial innovation has 
historically led to economic growth and increased social welfare, and how it should 
continue to do so in the future. Structured products could be the perfect channel to 
increase investment in financial innovation and accordingly benefit social welfare. This 
question of structured products providing social welfare benefits is the main topic of this 
paper, and will be analyzed at length in chapter 5. 
The other major benefit of structured products is that they promote efficient 
allocation of capital. If the needs of an investor could be met in the giant, inexpensive, 
and liquid markets of stocks, bonds, or foreign exchange, he or she would undoubtedly 
go elsewhere. By approaching financial engineers for solutions, investors are implying 
that they feel structured products is the optimal way to spend their money. If the market 
for structured products didn’t exist, that money would be either inefficiently allocated or 
removed from financial markets altogether. While the argument that the structured 
products market exists and is therefore valuable is hardly airtight, it is important to 
discuss that the market creates solutions which formerly did not exist. 
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The remainder of this paper is devoted to the specific aspects of structured 
products which add value to society and financial markets, and the aspects which may be 
detrimental to those goals. By examining the problems associated with prior financial 
innovation, specifically the events leading up to 2008, I will address how similar 
problems could arise in the structured products market in the future. After examining the 
risks posed by structured products, the following two chapters will analyze the effects of 
unique structured products. By analyzing the buyers, sellers, pricing, risks, and 
intermediaries of the products, each stage of the structuring process will be examined and 
tested for potential benefits and problems. The last chapter will address whether 
structured products truly add value to the market, society, and economy, or if they exist 
merely to generate commissions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
In 2009 in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the former chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Paul Volcker made the following statement about recent financial 
innovation: 
“[I have] found very little evidence that vast amounts of innovation in financial 
markets in recent years have had a visible effect on the productivity of the 
economy. Maybe you can show that I am wrong. All I know is that the economy 
was rising very nicely in the 1950s and 1960s without all of these innovations. 
Indeed, it was quite good in the 1980s without credit default swaps and without 
securitization and without CDOs”1 
Something Mr. Volcker may have forgotten to consider is that the elements of today’s 
financial markets are the result of hundreds of years of financial innovation. Concepts 
such as asset backed securitization, credit cards, and even issuing stock were at one time 
new types of financial innovation which have now become standard elements of a 
functioning financial market. In addition, it is not fair for Mr. Volcker to say that “the 
economy was rising very nicely in the 1950’s and 1960’s without all of these 
innovations.” There is an endless list of reasons why an economy can rise and fall, 
regardless of the presence of financial innovation. As Stephen Lumpkin wrote in 
“Regulatory Issues Related to Financial Innovation,” (2009) innovation is a natural aspect 
of the workings of any competitive system. By broadly condemning financial innovation, 
                                                            
1 Quoted in “Paul Volcker: Think More Broadly,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2009, p. R7. 
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rather than simply approaching it skeptically, Mr. Volker could be preventing the 
potential development of the next big breakthrough in the innovation of financial 
markets.  
 A consistent theme in financial literature is that innovation has led to some of the 
greatest advancements but also the worst economic crashes in history. The events and 
innovations that led to the financial crisis of 2008 undoubtedly fall on the extreme 
negative end of that spectrum, and have possibly tainted the public image on innovation 
because the wounds are so fresh. This paper will analyze the shortcomings which may 
have caused the recent financial crisis, and apply the same logic to the problems which 
could arise from the structured products market. It is important to note that while the 
recent financial crisis is the freshest in memory, crises have existed throughout the 
history of financial markets. That being said, the crisis of 2008 serves as an excellent case 
study which is easily applicable to the market of structured products which is the subject 
of this paper. 
 Before simply writing off the recent financial crisis as a wholesale failure of 
financial innovation, it is worth looking at other potential causes. In all likelihood, if 
mortgage securitization didn’t exist the events of 2008 may have played out differently, 
but that fact alone does not incriminate financial innovation. The real estate bubble by 
itself could easily be held responsible. As described in Allen (2003), France and Sweden 
have both had fast rises in housing prices during their history without any significant 
securitization of mortgages. The U.S. housing market was probably somewhat stimulated 
by the issuance of subprime mortgages, but even at the peak of lending only 20% of 
mortgages were considered subprime. To simply write off the recent crisis as a result of 
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financial innovation would be lazy. This paper will instead take the analysis one step 
further by examining some of the common market problems associated with financial 
innovation. From the slew of potential problems outlined in Lumpkin (2009), I will focus 
on systemic risk, information asymmetry, and credit rating issues due to their frequency 
in historical economic downturns and their potential relevance to the structured products 
market. By analyzing the role those three risks played in the recent financial crisis, I will 
apply my findings to the field of structured products and determine the policy decisions 
which could minimize those recurrent risks. 
2.1 Systemic Risk/Credit Rating Difficulty 
 The market for certain financially engineered products was allowed to grow 
rapidly to the point where it posed systemic risk to the market. The complicated and 
clearly misunderstood products were allowed to be used as risk-free capital to meet 
reserve requirements, and the market grew to a point where people who had never heard 
of a mortgage backed security or a credit default swap became victims of the decisions 
being made on Wall Street. When a product is in its infancy, the market does not know 
how to treat it. It is difficult to price, nearly impossible for credit rating agencies to rate, 
and the market can be illiquid or trade on something other than fundamental value. In 
retrospect, it seems absurd to consider rating mortgage backed securities on the same 
level as U.S. Treasuries. However, at the height of the housing bubble that’s exactly what 
took place in the United States. Without years of market research and experience to draw 
upon, the credit agencies simply couldn’t rate the securities accurately. Furthermore, 
Gennaioli (2010) cites the ‘shortage’ of available risk free assets at the time due to the 
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sharp reductions in debt under President Clinton. This call for risk free assets pushed the 
creation of AAA bonds by synthetic means. 
 It’s important to note that the entity of mortgage backed securities is not 
specifically to blame for the recent crisis. If one replaced “mortgage backed securities” 
with any other product that was new to the market, was incorrectly rated by reputable 
credit rating agencies, and was held as risk free capital by banks that were too big to fail, 
the economy would probably meet a similar fate. The institution of mortgage backed 
securities and asset backed securitization has become a major part of financial markets 
despite the financial crisis, and exists today. The major difference is that the market has 
learned from past mistakes such that the products are more appropriately priced, rated, 
and traded. 
2.2 Information Asymmetry 
 A recurring theme in economic downturns is the existence of information 
asymmetry. Information asymmetry occurs when one party in a transaction has more or 
better information than the counterparties in the transaction. Because all of the available 
information isn’t factored into the price of a good or service, the market doesn’t reflect 
true value and leads to adverse selection or moral hazard. As covered above in the 
discussion of credit rating agencies, not all the information regarding the riskiness of 
mortgage backed securities was reflected in the price or credit rating or the product. 
According to Gennaioli (2010), both the buyers and the intermediaries perceived the 
products to be as riskless as the AAA rating suggested, because they deemed the odds of 
a nationwide housing crash to be a nearly impossible. The information asymmetry, or 
more accurately the general lack of information or experience with the products, caused 
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the market to crumble when housing prices dropped. There is nothing wrong with issuing 
a product that has the possibility of default, failure, etc. However, that real risk needs to 
be reflected in the price. Just ask anyone who has invested in Greek sovereign debt since 
2010. There is a legitimate risk that Greece will not be able to fulfill its sovereign debt 
obligations, but that reality is reflected in the high coupons on the bonds and would 
certainly never be described at risk free. 
 Information asymmetry does not only hurt the buyers who get sold a false bill of 
goods. As discussed in George Akerlof’s “The Market for ‘Lemons” (1970), information 
asymmetry can cause markets to disappear as a result of quality uncertainty on the part of 
the potential buyers. Using the market for used cars as an example, Akerlof describes 
how used car salesmen are hurt by the existence of lemons in the market. Prospective 
used car buyers have the difficult (or impossible) task of distinguishing between good 
cars and lemons. The unfortunate results on the market are as follows: 
“[T]here is incentive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the 
returns for good quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose statistic is 
affected rather than to the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a 
reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the market.” 
(Akerlof p. 1) 
Because used car salesmen have no way of demonstrating the quality of their products, 
the quality of the cars decreases due to lack of positive incentives and the overall market 
size shrinks. The same situation can arise with financial innovation. If a financial product 
is new and unproven, investors have reason to worry that they are being sold a financial 
‘lemon.’ The financial engineers then face the difficult task of defending their product to 
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a skeptical public who are well aware of past financial innovation-fueled market failures. 
Just like with used cars, the presence of asymmetric information can cause the market for 
the new product to disappear. 
2.3 Proposed Regulatory Solutions 
 The solution to the problems associated with financial innovation is not to broadly 
condemn the institution which has allowed financial markets to progress into the 21st 
century. Like any other industry, innovation drives competitiveness and success. Rather, 
the solution is to address those three major issues while avoiding stymieing potentially 
beneficial innovation. But before advocating broad financial liberalization, it is 
worthwhile to examine the history of liberalization and the problems it has caused 
throughout history. There is a cost/benefit ratio of financial liberalization vs. financial 
regulation, and governments need to walk a fine line to avoid disaster. 
 Robert Litan is clearly on the side of little regulation. In “In Defense of Much, 
But Not All Financial Innovation” (2010), he writes: 
“If a skeptical view of financial innovation takes hold – either because the 
benefits of innovation are perceived to be presumptively small and/or the risks of 
catastrophic damage are feared to be non-trivial – then policymakers (and even 
voters) are likely to demand some sort of pre-emptive screening and possibly 
design mandates before financial innovations are permitted to be sold in the 
marketplace. This attitude very like would chill the development of financial 
innovations that would benefit consumers, homeowners and investors. (45) 
Litan goes on to argue how pre-emptive regulation could have prevented the development 
of the airplane, automobile, and the internet. He states that pre-emptive regulation’s sole 
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purpose in the financial markets is regarding long term contracts, because consumers 
aren’t always rational in those cases. Behavior finance has shown that consumers can be 
irrational in both short and long term investments, and require some level of protection 
from a government agency. I understand Mr. Litan’s perspective, but levels of regulation 
higher than what he has prescribed are necessary to prevent crises. I believe that goal can 
be accomplished without quelling major financial innovations.  
2.4 Information asymmetry for structured products 
 In terms of regulating financial innovation, including structured products, 
regulators need to focus on the problems of information asymmetry, credit rating 
difficulty, and potential systemic risk. Information asymmetry poses problems for 
financial markets in general, but those problems tend to be concentrated on new products. 
Documents such as SEC filings and organizations such as the Better Business Bureau 
work to combat problems of asymmetric information by making information available to 
investors and the public. Agencies such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
and the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau advocate consumer awareness regarding 
structured products, and frequently post warnings regarding potential dangerous, 
confusing or misleading investment vehicles. The government and other agencies already 
do much to break down problems of information asymmetry to the point where the 
responsibility lies with the consumer to try and ascertain all available materials prior to 
making an investment. With structured products this is not simple, and poses the 
strongest counterargument to structured products advocates. Terms of a deal may be 
complicated, and the underlying options structure even more so. Furthermore, the 
learning curve is steepened by the fact that each product relies on a different basic 
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structure and accordingly has a unique payout structure. In short, the field of structured 
products is not for the inexperienced investor. I believe regulatory agencies have done as 
much as they can in terms of requiring information disclosure and SEC filings. If 
investors are still uncomfortable or confused about the product, they should probably put 
their money elsewhere. 
 The one major problem worth mentioning regarding information asymmetry in 
structured products markets is in regards to commissions. As discussed in Bergstresser 
(2008), many early structured products deals yielded unprecedented commissions of up to 
6%. These high commissions are characteristic of a young, illiquid market where 
investors do not have the opportunity to compare prices. Because structured products are 
so complicated, oftentimes the commission is hidden in the options structure rather than 
take off the top of the sale. As a result, investors do not know how much of a premium 
they are paying for products. However, I don’t think the answer to this problem is 
mandatory disclosure. If a customer goes to the supermarket to buy a loaf of bread, it is 
not the responsibility of the supermarket to post the profit they are making on the sale of 
the loaf of bread. Rather, it is the responsibility of the customer to shop around to see if 
they can find the same loaf of bread for a cheaper price. In basic economic theory (and 
assuming few barriers to market entry), if the first supermarket is charging too much for 
bread other market players will force prices down by undercutting the competition. By 
the same token, the market for structured products has grown to the point where investors 
can shop for products among dozens of issuers. In my research, there has been no recent 
evidence of the exorbitantly high commissions of a decade ago. The market has grown to 
a point where unfair commissions would not stand up to market competition. 
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Furthermore, financial engineers understand that it is also in their best interest to break 
down information asymmetry. As discussed in Akerlof (1970), problems with 
information can lead to market disappearance if consumers are unable to distinguish 
between good and bad products. 
2.5 Credit rating for structured products 
 The issue of ‘credit rating’ is not a major problem for structured products. 
Viewing ‘credit rating’ as the risk of loss of principal, there are two scenarios which need 
to be appreciated by the investor. The first scenario is the risk of the bankruptcy of the 
issuing firm. As Bergstresser (2008) discusses, investors in Lehman products learned the 
hard way in the fall of 2008 that structured products are debt obligations of the issuer. If 
the issuer is unable to make the payments upon the maturity of the note, the investor 
suffers a loss regardless of the performance of the note. While it is not a perfect science, 
credit agencies do a sufficient job of rating the stability of banks to the point where 
investors understand the associated risks. The second matter to consider is the payout 
structure of the note, and the likelihood of each payout scenario. I do not view this as a 
major issue because the payout structure of even the most complicated structured product 
is usually the simplest aspect of the note. While the options structure may be more 
difficult to understand, the payout structure and the implications for the individual 
investor’s portfolio are not overly complicated. Of the three major financial innovation 
problems, ‘credit rating’ is the least problematic when dealing with structured products. 
2.6 Systemic risk for structured products 
 The last of the three financial innovation problems deals with the issue of 
systemic risk. If the consequences of a market are isolated to only the investors involved, 
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there is little cause for concern. While the investors in the market need to be protected 
from issues such as false information, at a minimum the problems are isolated to the 
market participants. If the only people hurt in 2007 had been subprime mortgage backed 
security investors, the world would be a different place. As discussed earlier, the depth 
and breadth of the market left the entire developed world holding the bag when the 
United States’ housing market collapsed. Financially engineered products, particularly in 
their infancy, should not be used to meet capital or collateral requirements. The 
uncertainty which surrounds a new product regardless of the specific situation is enough 
to warrant a significant level of skepticism. In regards to structured products, they should 
never be held as any type of risk-free collateral. The complicated nature combined with 
the credit risk of financial institutions makes even a principal protected note questionable 
to some extent. The market is currently small enough where this is a non-issue, but is 
regardless worth mentioning. 
2.7 Future Outlook and Summary 
Having now viewed structured products through the lens of the three major 
problems of financial innovation, it is prudent to make an important distinction. With a 
type of financial innovation such as asset backed securities or stock options, there comes 
a point where it is no longer viewed as new product. The product becomes liquid and 
investors become familiar with the structure, and it poses less of the potential problems 
financially engineered products face in their infancy primary due to increased 
information. Accordingly, regulation is still required but to a lesser degree of stringency. 
I don’t foresee that type of standardization happening with structured products. Each 
structured product is unique in terms of structure, credit risk, and underlying components. 
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An infinite number of products could be structured and unique concerns associated with 
each one, and the products will always be illiquid. In the way stock options have 
assimilated into the portfolio and vernacular of average investors, I don’t see how 
structured products could experience the same mainstream acceptance any time in the 
near future. 
 As covered throughout this chapter, financial innovation is a tricky class of 
products to regulate. Too much regulation stifles growth, and not enough regulation can 
wreak havoc on investors and the broader economy. That being said, structured products 
currently receive the ideal amount of regulation. Information asymmetry is minimized by 
SEC filings and similar publications. Credit risk of individual products is explained in 
relatively simple terms, and the credit risk of issuing banks is rated on an ongoing basis 
by the major rating agencies. The last problem, systemic risk, seems negligible based on 
the size of the market in relative terms. If the market was to increase drastically in 
proportional terms, or if banks started to use notes to meet capital requirements, these 
issues would be immediately relevant and call for regulatory intervention. 
The fact that structured products seem to have avoided the common problems of 
financial innovation isn’t enough to validate its existence in the market. In “In Defense of 
Much, But Not All Financial Innovation”, Robert Litan lists the four economic functions 
of finance as follows: “Enabling parties to pay each other, mobilizing society’s savings, 
channeling those savings towards productive investments, and allocating financial risks 
to those most willing and able to bear them.” In examining the product structures in the 
next two chapters, please keep these four functions in mind in order to judge the 
contributions structured products may or may not make to finance. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REVERSE EXCHANGEABLE 
Reverse exchangeable notes are one of the simpler types of structured products. 
The performance of the note is typically tied to a single underlying stock, and offers a 
way for an investor to receive relatively high short-term income compared to other 
investment opportunities by taking on the risk of the performance of the stock. In a 
reverse exchangeable, the investor receives a monthly coupon regardless of the 
performance of the stock. If the value of the stock drops below an established “knock-in 
barrier,” the investor receives shares of the stock at the maturity of the note. If the stock 
never breaks this barrier, the investor receives their principal back at maturity. Because 
reverse exchangeable owners make money if the underlying rises in value or drops a 
small amount, the investors generally have a bullish or neutral opinion of the equity. 
This chapter will study a specific reverse exchangeable issued by the Bank of Montreal, 
as reported by Susanna Moon in Structured Products Daily: 
Chicago, Sept. 29 – Bank of Montreal priced $14,000 of 13% annualized reverse 
exchangeable notes due Dec. 30, 2011 linked to Alcoa Inc. shares, according to a 
424B2 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Interest is payable 
monthly. The payout at maturity will be par unless Alcoa stock closes below the 
trigger price – 75% of the initial share price – during the life of the notes and the 
final share price is less than the initial share price, in which case the payout will 
be a number of shares of Alcoa stock equal to $1,000 divided by the initial share 
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price or, at the issuer’s option, a cash amount equal to the value of those shares. 
BMO Capital Markets Corp. is the agent.2 
 In this case, the underlying equity behind the reverse exchangeable is Alcoa 
Common Stock (ticker AA). The “initial” price of the stock is $10.48, because that was 
the last price the stock traded at when the deal was priced. Therefore, the 75% knock-in 
barrier (also known as trigger price) was simultaneously established at $7.86. Using the 
terms described in the article above, the possible outcomes of the note can be separated 
into three categories. 
A: If over the life of the note (3 months), Alcoa’s stock does not lose more than 25% of 
its value (observed at 4pm daily), the investor will receive his monthly payments of 13% 
annualized. His total return on the investment will be 3.25% in a mere three months. 
B: If Alcoa’s stock does break the knock-in barrier at any point during the three month 
period and the stock finishes below the initial share value, he will own the failing stock at 
the end of the three month period. He has the option to receive the shares of the stock, 
which is known as physical delivery, in the hopes that the stock will eventually recover. 
If the investor has a still negative view of the stock, he can opt for cash settlement which 
involves taking the losses immediately. 
C: Alcoa’s stock drops by more than 25% at some point over the life of the note, but then 
recovers all its losses for a net gain because the owner now owns stock which is trading 
higher than its initial value. Statistically, this is the most unlikely scenario and would 
typically only arise with the most volatile stocks. 
                                                            
2 Structured Products Daily September 30, 2011 
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Figure 1: Payout Structure of Alcoa Reverse Exchangeable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Buyers 
Now that the payout structure of the note has been explained, the next thing to 
consider is the target audience of the note. Due to the small size of the deal, the note was 
most likely designed for a single investor. However, many large deals will be marketed to 
multiple investors because the costs to the issuing firm are generally fixed. 
With reverse exchangeables, the easiest customers to sell the product to are 
current owners of the underlying stock, in this case Alcoa. Because they are owners of 
the underlying, it is safe to assume that they have at least a neutral position on the stock, 
if not better. Also, the worst thing that can happen to a reverse exchangeable is that it 
takes on the form of the underlying. In this case, the former stock owner is no worse off 
than he would have been if he owned the stock, and he/she extracted some high short-
term income from his investment, even though the underlying stock lost money. A typical 
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pitch to an investor would suggest putting 25% of their stock position into a reverse 
exchangeable, and keeping the remaining 75% as equity. 
 Reverse exchangeables are not appealing for stock owners who have an extremely 
bullish view of the stock. In the case of Alcoa, it’s hard to believe that many investors are 
feeling that confident about the stock at the moment, due to the relatively high coupon. 
However, an important quality of these products is that there is a maximum return on 
investment, while there is no minimum. The most an investor could earn over the life of 
the notes is 3.25% (13% annualized), so an investor with positive convictions about 
Alcoa should probably be advised to simply invest in the underlying equity. On the other 
hand, reverse exchangeables aren’t for extremely bearish clients, because the notes have 
the opportunity to return none of the original investment if Alcoa’s price per share falls to 
$0. The ideal candidate for a reverse exchangeable has a relatively neutral opinion on the 
future of the stock, and is willing to take a level of risk in return for the opportunity for 
high short-term income. Because of the payoff structure of the instrument illustrated in 
the graph on the previous page, the only way an investment in this reverse exchangeable 
won’t outperform Alcoa’s common stock is if Alcoa gains more than 3.25% (13% 
annualized) in the three months of the note. Furthermore, the customer receives complete 
downside protection down to the trigger price of $7.86. 
 The obvious question right now is: Why doesn’t the investor simply build the 
product himself? The biggest reason is that knock-in options cannot be traded by 
everyone. They are an exotic option which would need to be purchased through a 
financial engineering desk at a firm, which works in conjunction with structurers. In any 
case, the firm would most likely take a cut for putting together a knock-in option package 
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in the same way they would in putting together a reverse exchangeable. The second 
reason to invest in a reverse exchangeable rather than structuring the product on one’s 
own is the complicated nature of structuring. Structuring requires a vast amount of 
knowledge and experience in financial engineering. Without a doubt, the customer pays a 
premium for this service, but there are enough firms which deal in structured products to 
prevent firms from taking commissions above an appropriate level. Otherwise, they 
would simply be undercut by their competition. Lastly, as mentioned above, the reverse 
exchangeable allows investors to make money on a neutral opinion of the underlying 
stock. Historically, if an investor didn’t see a stock moving in the short term, the best 
investment decision they could make was simply not investing in the stock. Using 
structured products, and specifically reverse exchangeables, the same investor with a 
neutral outlook on Alcoa can receive high short-term income if his prediction becomes a 
reality. 
3.2 Sellers 
Up until this point, the information regarding Bank of Montreal’s Alcoa reverse 
exchangeable has been from the prospective of the buyer and the information they are 
presented with by the Bank of Montreal. Behind the scenes, the traders at the bank are 
buying and selling exotic options in order to minimize or ideally eliminate the risk of the 
note. These transactions are likely taking place with exotic options traders at competing 
firms, because few individuals deal in exotic options. As in any market, a price for each 
exotic option has to be reached such that both parties are satisfied with the transaction. 
In the case of a reverse exchangeable, there are two options involved: Bank of 
Montreal sells a knock-in put and buys a knock-in call, both with a strike price of $10.48 
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(100% of the initial value). These knock-in options become vanilla options when the 
price of Alcoa closes at or below $7.48 (75% of initial value). The combination of these 
two options makes the product behave the same way as the stock once the knock-in 
barrier has been breached. The combination of a put and call with the same strike price 
on the same stock make the payoff structure identical to the underlying. Through these 
options, all the possible outcomes of the product can be classified into three categories, 
and are illustrated in Figure 1 on page 22. 
A: If the value of the Alcoa’s common stock never breaches the knock-in barrier, 
neither options knocks-in, and the investor simply receives the coupon payments plus 
principal at maturity. 
B: If the knock-in barrier is breached, and the stock never recovers to its initial level, 
only the knock-in put will be exercised. As soon as the barrier is breached, the 
knock-in put behaves as a vanilla put with a strike price of $10.48. That option is “in-
the-money” as long as the stock is trading below its initial value, and therefore the 
option will be executed by the option holder upon the maturity of the note. The 
investor in Alcoa’s reverse exchangeable will either receive physical or cash 
settlement of the note. 
C: If the knock-in barrier is breached, and the stock recovers to its initial level or 
higher, the knock-in call will be exercised. As soon as the barrier is breached, the 
knock-in call behaves as a vanilla call with a strike price of $10.48. That option is 
“in-the-money” as long as the stock is trading above its initial value, and therefore 
the option will be executed by the option holder upon the maturity of the note. The 
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investor in Alcoa’s reverse exchangeable will receive physical or cash settlement of 
the note at a profit. 
3.3 Pricing 
 The pricing of the note is based on the credit risk of Bank of Montreal, and the 
cost of the embedded options. Because the note is unsecured debt issued by Bank of 
Montreal, a small part of the coupon paid to the investor will reflect the likelihood of the 
firm being unable to make the guaranteed coupon payments over the life of the note. The 
note has a term of merely three months, so this amount would be negligible for the Alcoa 
reverse exchangeable. 
 Another factor is the premium gained from selling the knock-in put vs. buying the 
knock-in call. The knock-in put, because it is statistically more likely than the knock-in 
call to occur, brings in much of the money which forms the guaranteed coupon payments. 
 One of the most important variables which affect option pricing is the anticipated 
dividend of the equity. When a company earns profits, they have the option to either 
reinvest the earnings or pay them out to shareholders as dividends. This is an important 
issue is general options investment, as well as reverse exchangeables. Because the 
investor in a reverse exchangeable does not own the stock, he does not gain anything 
from earnings being paid out as dividends. In fact, dividends paid out increase the 
chances that the share price will drop over the life of the note, holding all other variables 
constant. Historical dividends are not a guarantee of future dividends, but the fact the last 
three dividends paid by Alcoa were $0.03 certainly helped the marketability of this note. 
If the historical dividends were higher, one could expect the knock-in barrier to be lower, 
the coupon to be higher, or some combination of both to subsidize the investor for the 
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higher anticipated dividends. Here are a few more generalities about the effect of 
different variables on reverse exchangeables. 
 Holding other variables constant, the higher the volatility of the stock, the higher 
the coupon the note will pay. This is because the stock is more likely to “knock-
in” if it is volatile.  
 Holding other variables constant, the longer the term of the note, the higher the 
annualized coupon will be. 
 Holding other variables constant, the lower the “knock-in barrier” of the note, the 
lower the coupon will be. The lower the barrier, the less likely the stock is to 
“knock-in.”  
3.4 Intermediaries/Selling Points 
 Once the product has been priced, a member of Bank of Montreal’s sales team is 
charged with convincing clients that the reverse exchangeable is a worthwhile 
investment. In addition to explaining the pros and cons of the product, the sales person 
needs to convince the potential investor that the product is superior to similar alternatives. 
 Earlier in the chapter, the reverse exchangeable was compared simply to an 
investment in the underlying, Alcoa common stock. The reverse exchangeable 
outperforms the stock in all instances where the stock price drops, as well as in 
circumstances where the stock gains less than 3.25% over the three month life of the 
product. If the stock gains more than 3.25%, a simple investment in the stock would be 
the more profitable investment. 
 A major advantage of the reverse exchangeable is that it allows the investor to 
extract income from having a neutral opinion about the stock. While selling put options 
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has similar payout characteristics, selling puts is typically considered a bullish stock play. 
Through my research, I have found no better way to express a neutral stock opinion than 
through a reverse exchangeable. In the case of the Alcoa product, the investor receives 
his principal plus generous interest at the end of the note if the stock never goes below 
75% of its initial value. In an environment where short term interest rates are miniscule, 
the opportunity to make an annualized 13% is impressive despite the added risk of loss. 
 The tax implications of the reverse exchangeable are not advantageous for the 
investor. For tax purposes, the benefits from the note are divided into interest payment 
and option premium, with option premium covering the vast majority of the taxable 
income. If the reverse exchangeable expires without the knock-in barrier having been 
breached, the option is not exercised and those proceeds are treated as short term capital 
gains. If the knock-in barrier is breached, the tax basis of the shares acquired is reduced 
by the premium paid of the put option. While this would be slightly advantageous for the 
investor, the situation would only arise following at least a 25% loss on the initial 
investment. For that reason, the reverse exchangeable is not particularly advantageous for 
tax planning. 
 The characteristics of the Alcoa reverse exchangeable are similar to those of 
selling a put option on the stock. Both methods provide the investor with some level of 
limited upside potential, but unlimited downside if the stock drops to zero. The major 
difference between the two methods comes from the knock-in options. Because the 
options embedded in the reverse exchangeable are knock-in options, the owner of the 
product has downside protection up until a drop of 25% in the stock’s value. Another 
difference, although less likely to occur, is the situation which arises if the stock dips by 
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more than 25% but recovers to higher than its initial value. If the investor had simply sold 
a vanilla at-the-money put option on the stock, the person who bought the put option 
would simply not exercise it. The reverse exchangeable investor would keep his fixed 
premium, regardless of how high the stock went. If the investor had put their money into 
a reverse exchangeable, he would pocket any gains over the initial value because he now 
owns a call with a strike price equal to the initial value of the stock. The knock-in put 
which was sold would expire unexercised, and the knock-in call would be exercised at a 
profit to the investor. 
 As described above, the primary difference between the reverse exchangeable and 
a vanilla put option revolves around the behavior of the instruments if Alcoa’s stock does 
drop by more than 25%. If such an event occurs, the owner of the reverse exchangeable 
immediately takes a loss of 25%, because the knock-in put starts to behave as a vanilla 
put. In the same scenario (Alcoa drops 25%), the owner of a plain vanilla put begins to 
lose money only beyond the strike price of the put. In other words: If Alcoa’s stock price 
drops to $7.34 (70% of the initial value) and stays there, an investor in the reverse 
exchangeable loses 30% of his principal. The seller of a put option with a strike price of 
75% loses only 5% of his initial investment. Because of this major difference, the 
premium earned from investing in the reverse exchangeable are much higher than the 
premium gained from selling a 75% put. This situation is superimposed below in red on 
the graph from page 22, illustrating the lower risk and appropriately lower return on the 
put as compared to all of the reverse exchangeable’s payout scenarios. 
 Selling a put is no better or worse of a strategy than investing in the reverse 
exchangeable. Rather, it just fits a different risk profile. Selling a put commits a relatively 
 29 
small amount of capital, while investing in the reverse exchangeable involves lending the 
entire principal to the Bank of Montreal (much like buying a bond). Selling a put on an 
exchange does not involve the credit risk which is inherent in any structured product. 
Lastly, as mentioned above, the return on the reverse exchangeable is so high because it 
is a significantly riskier investment. 
 
Figure 2: Payout Structure Comparison between Reverse Exchangeable and Put Option 
Sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 The figure on the next page summarizes all the transactions which took place in 
the structuring and ultimate sale of the Alcoa reverse exchangeable. First, the Bank of 
Montreal sold the knock-in put to Firm X. Second, the Bank of Montreal bought the 
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knock-in call from Firm Y. Third, the knock-in put, knock-in call were combined, along 
with the intrinsic credit risk of the Bank of Montreal into the clean, marketable reverse 
exchangeable (denoted by the blue arrows). This finished product was sold to the 
customer in exchange for lending money to the firm, to be returned in full on the 
condition that Alcoa did not drop below 75% of its initial value.3 
 
Figure 3: Transactions Within The Structuring and Sale of Alcoa Reverse Exchangeable 
       Sellers                            Buyers 
Bank of Montreal                  Firm X 
Firm Y                             Bank of Montreal 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
[Bank of Montreal]           [Reverse Exchangeable Investor] 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 The reverse exchangeable expired on December 30, 2011 without knocking in. Investors in the product earned a 
3.25% return on investment in three months. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
UPTURN NOTE 
Upturn notes are another popular structured product. The note can be tied to 
almost anything: stocks, commodities, or an index. The purpose of the note is to amplify 
small gains in the underlying, at the cost of giving up participation in abnormally high 
gains. Unlike the reverse exchangeable, no coupons are received during the life of the 
note, and all gains or losses are realized when the note expires. The typical upturn note 
investor is moderately bullish on the underlying because he only makes money if the 
price of the underlying rises. However, a more bullish play would be simply investing in 
the underlying to avoid being bound by the participation limit of an upturn note. 
The specific upturn note to be examined in this chapter was priced by Citigroup on May 
24, 2007. The information below was taken from Citigroup’s official SEC filing. 
On May 24, 2007, Citigroup priced $35.2 million worth of $10 upturn notes linked to the 
performance of the S&P 500 index, due December 4, 2008. The upside participation rate 
is 300%, subject to a cap of 16% overall return. Participation on the downside will be on 
a one-for-one basis. The agents’ fee for this note is 2.25%, or $0.225 for every $10 note. 
 As stated above, the performance of the upturn note is dependent on the S&P 500, 
which is typically regarded as the standard metric for the performance of U.S. stocks. If 
the S&P 500 gains value, the investor profits from the upturn note. If the S&P 500 loses 
value, the investor loses money on his note. However, the payment structure is a bit more 
complicated than that. Like the reverse exchangeable, the possible payout scenarios can 
be grouped into three categories. 
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A: If over the life of the note, the S&P 500 gains between 0% and 5.33% then the return 
on the note equals the return of the S&P 500 multiplied by three. This is what is meant by 
the “300% participation rate.” 
B: If over the life of the note, the S&P 500 gains more than 5.33% then the return on the 
note is equal to 16%. This is what is meant by the “cap of 16% overall return.” As a 
result of the options structure, the gain of amplifying small returns means that the 
investor gives up participation in extremely high returns. 
C: If over the life of the note, the S&P 500 loses value, then the return of the note is 
equal to the loss of the S&P 500. This is what is meant by “one-for-one downside 
participation.” 
IMPORTANT: Rather than embedding the commission into the options, Citigroup took 
their commission off the top (Agent’s Fee). The investor in the structured note gives 
Citigroup $10, and the 2.25% is taken out of that. Thus, all increases and decreases begin 
at $9.775, not $10. 
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 Figure 4: Performance of the Upturn Note vs. the Performance of the S&P 500 (excl. 
fees) 
 
4.1 Buyers 
This was an enormous deal by Citigroup ($34.2 million), so there were 
undoubtedly multiple investors in the note. Oftentimes notes are sold to financial advisors 
who act as middle men by selling the product to more average investors. Due to 
economies of scale, this reduces the fees (in percentage terms) associated with structuring 
the note. While it is impossible to know for sure, this could likely have been the fate of 
this upturn note. 
 As touched upon in the earlier sections, the ideal investor in the S&P 500 upturn 
note is someone who is moderately bullish on the American Stock Market. Because the 
return on the notes is capped, someone who sees the S&P 500 rising considerably in the 
short term would probably not want to purchase the note. Their money would (probably) 
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be better spent invested in a mutual fund which mirrors the S&P 500. In the SEC filing, 
Citigroup lists potential buyers in the following three categories: 
 Investors possessing a moderate growth view on the S&P 500 Index who are 
looking for leveraged upside exposure subject to a maximum return, and who can 
withstand the risk of losing the principal amount of their investment. 
Investors who are confident that the S&P 500 is ready for enormous growth in the 
short to medium term would be better off investing in a fund which mirrored the 
performance of the broad stock market. In addition, investors looking for 
principal protection should shop elsewhere, as this note features full participation 
in the losses of the S&P 500. 
 Investors who seek to add an equity-index-linked investment to further diversify 
their portfolio. 
This simply means that the upturn note could be used to diversify a portfolio 
where equity-index-linked investment tools are underrepresented. 
 Current or prospective holders of exchange-traded funds benchmarked to the 
S&P 500 Index or similar underlying. 
If an investor already holds exchange-traded funds benchmarked to the S&P 500, 
it is safe to assume that the investor is at least somewhat bullish on the future of 
the index, and may want to leverage his position. 
4.2 Sellers 
 The unique payout structure of an upturn note is due to three identical call 
spreads, and a put option. A call spread involves buying a call on the underlying, and 
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selling a call on the underlying at a higher strike price. In the case of Citigroup’s S&P 
500 upturn note, calls were bought at-the-money, and calls were sold at 105.33% of the 
strike price. The use of three of these call spreads in the upturn note gives its leveraged 
upside. To account for the payout structure when the underlying return is negative, a put 
option is sold at the money. Much like the reverse exchangeable, the payout possibilities 
can be put into three categories. 
A: If the return of the S&P 500 is greater than 5.33% over the life of the note, the put 
option expires out of the money. However, both of the call options which make up the 
call spread are exercised because they are in-the-money. The three call options which 
Citigroup purchased at-the-money are exercised, capturing three times the returns of the 
S&P 500 over the life of the note. At the same time, the call options which Citigroup sold 
at 105.33% of the initial value of the S&P 500 are also exercised. By way of this second 
group of call options, Citigroup essentially gives away the returns of the S&P 500 above 
5.33% to the owner of the call options. 
B: If the return of the S&P 500 is between 0% and 5.33% over the life of the note, the put 
option expires out of the money. The call options which were sold at 105.33% of the 
initial value also expire out of the money. The only options which is in-the-money are the 
at the money call options which Citigroup bought on the open market. Citigroup 
exercises the three call options, capturing three times the return of the S&P 500 over the 
life of the note. 
C: If the return of the S&P 500 is negative over the life of the note, the only option which 
is in the money is the at-the-money put which Citigroup sold. Both aspects of the call 
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spread expire out of the money. The firm or individual who bought the put option from 
Citigroup exercises the options, which forces the investor to take the losses of the S&P 
500 over the life of the note. 
4.3 Pricing 
The pricing of the upturn note is based on the credit risk of Citigroup, and the 
embedded options. Like any structured product, the note is a debt of the issuing firm, and 
if Citigroup does not survive the life of the note the investor will most likely lose his 
principal regardless of the performance of the S&P 500. While the credit risk of the three 
month reverse exchangeable was a small aspect of the overall coupon, credit risk is more 
of a factor in the S&P 500 upturn note because of the longer term of the note. 
Because the upturn note doesn’t contain any exotic options, the payout structure is 
easier to visualize. The investor receives leveraged upside up to a point, at the cost of 
both the Agent’s Fees and the limited upside participation. However, the calls which 
Citigroup buys at-the-money are more expensive than the premiums they receive from 
selling the calls at 105.33% of initial value because the higher prices call options are less 
likely to be profitable. However, this is counteracted by Citigroup selling an at-the-
money put option which brings in premiums in exchange for taking on the risk that the 
value of the S&P 500 falls. A potential buyer of the at-the-money put most likely has a 
negative outlook on the index, or would like protection against such an event whether he 
considers it likely or not. For example, an elderly (or other risk-averse) person might not 
be able to afford taking the risk that the stock market will drop. They consider it 
worthwhile to pay a fixed premium to avoid downside participation in the U.S. stock 
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market. Buying the at-the-money put from Citigroup functions as insurance against such 
an event taking place.  
In regards to the calls, different stories can be told. For the investors that sell the 
at-the-money call to Citigroup, they are hoping for the S&P 500 to drop in value. At the 
time the upturn note was issued, the U.S. stock market was approaching record highs. 
The potential seller of the call could have recognized this fact, and used the sale of the 
call to extract income from their market outlook. The buyer of the 105.33% call has the 
opposite backstory. In order for the buyer of that call to make money, the stock market 
needed to rise 5.33% over the life of the options contract. This investor didn’t think the 
market was done growing, and accordingly paid a premium to participate in high market 
gains. It is important to note that none of the options embedded in the upturn note are 
exotic or complicated, and as such the market players of the other side of the individual 
trades could be either firms or simple individual investors. The mechanics of each of 
these option transactions is summarized in the flowchart at the end of this chapter. 
All the call and put options are straightforward, liquid, and regularly traded. 
Accordingly, this means that the S&P 500 note would not be difficult for investors to 
recreate, in principle. Before investing in any structured products, individual investors 
always need to consider whether the fees associated with the product are worth the 
benefits. Considering the number of mutual funds and indexes which replicate the S&P 
500 is a variety of ways, some investors would not pay the 2.25% to invest in Citigroup’s 
upturn note. 
 38 
 In the reverse exchangeable in the previous chapter, time value of money was 
negligible due to the low rates environment of 2011 and the short, three month term of 
the note. When this product was issued in May of 2007, investors could earn nearly 5% 
by investing in so-called “risk free” one year U.S. treasury notes. The rate environment 
undoubtedly affects the terms of structured products, because the money taken in from 
the note is a debt obligation of Citigroup. If they are able to earn higher returns on their 
investments on the open market, they are willing to pay higher rates to borrow that 
money. If a similar upturn note was issued in 2012, the cap would most likely be lower, 
as investors would be willing to cap their potential earnings at a lower rate. Short term 
rates in 2012 are essentially at zero, and the stock market outlook isn’t nearly as 
promising as it was in 2007. Investors in today’s market conditions would be far more 
willing to settle for lower return amplification, because they have no alternative options 
to earn high rates of return without taking on enormous risk. 
4.4 Intermediaries/Selling Points 
 One of the major selling points of Citigroup’s 300% Upturn Note is that the terms 
are relatively simple when compared to other structured products. No exotic options are 
embedded, and no knock-in barriers affect the pay structure. Furthermore, the underlying 
equity risk is the S&P 500, the most commonly observed indicator of U.S. stock 
performance.  
 As mentioned in the “Buyers” section, investors in the note receive leverage on 
relatively small gains at the cost of not participating in what would be historically high 
growth. Although past performance of the S&P 500 would by no means be an indication 
of future growth, one must consider the state of the economy when this note was issued 
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in 2007. U.S. stocks were growing at upwards of 10% a year, and potential upturn note 
investors in 2007 would have worried about not participating fully if that growth 
continued. As you may have guessed, this particular upturn note cost investors much of 
their principal as a result of the crash in the fall of 2008. However, the downside 
participation of the note is exactly the same as a broad investment in the S&P 500. With 
the exception of agent’s fees paid up front, the upturn investor would be no worse off if 
they were invested in the broader American economy. On the upside, the upturn note still 
outperforms the S&P 500 for any positive gains below 16%. Although the full 300% 
participation is not utilized above returns of 5.33%, the investor still earns a return which 
is amplified by the structure of the note. This would undoubtedly be a major selling point 
for the product. 
 There are few products in the market which offer leveraged upside participation 
without leveraged downside. ETFs will sometimes offer leverage linked to an index such 
as the S&P 500, but that leverage typically involves both positive and negative 
fluctuations in the underlying. That being said, the most comparable product to the upturn 
note would be a simple investment in the S&P 500. While such an investment doesn’t 
involve leverage, in both cases the investor makes money when the index is up, and loses 
money when the index is down. In the case of the downside, the potential for loss is 
identical. While potential investors may have their own personal opinions on why the 
S&P 500 will grow slowly in the short or medium term, they share the same outlook as 
standard S&P 500 investors on the direction of the anticipated growth. As is frequently 
the case with structured products, the uniqueness of the upturn note is another major 
selling point. 
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 The tax implications of the upturn note could be advantageous for investors. As 
described in Citigroup’s SEC filing, any proceeds from the upturn note should be treated 
as long term capital gains tax which is well below the short term capital gains rate and  
income tax rates. For investors in a 25% income tax bracket or above, they would pay a 
15% tax on gains from the upturn note. For investors below the 25% income tax bracket, 
they would be obligated to pay between 0% and 10% of their upturn notes gain as a tax. 
Many retirees fall below the 25% income tax bracket, and therefore may find the upturn 
note attractive based on the ability to pay minimal tax on their upturn note income in the 
form of long term capital gains. 
4.5 Summary 
The figure on the next page summarizes all of the transactions which took place in the 
structuring and sale of Citigroup’s S&P 500-linked upturn note. All the transactions, 
including the ultimate sale of the upturn note, allocated market players trade risk in 
exchange for insurance. First, Citigroup bought three calls at the money from Firm X. 
Next, Citigroup sold three calls at 105.33% of the initial value to Firm Y. Third, 
Citigroup sold an at-the-money put option to Firm Z. The options were bundled with the 
inherent credit risk of Citigroup into $35.2 million worth of upturn notes, denoted by the 
blue arrows. The finished product was sold to customers in exchange for lending capital 
to the Citigroup, to be returned in an amount conditional to the performance of the S&P 
5004. 
 
                                                            
4 The upturn note expired on December 4th 2008 on the heels of the crash of fall 2008. The S&P 500 (and the note) 
lost 44% of its initial value over the life of the note. 
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        Figure 5: Transactions Within the Structuring and Sale of S&P 500 Upturn Note 
 Sellers        Buyers 
        Firm X              Citigroup 
      Citigroup                     Firm Y 
      Citigroup                     Firm Z 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100% Call
105.33% Call
100% Put
100% Call 
105.33% Call 
100% Put 
300% Leveraged 
Upturn Note 
(subject to a cap of 
16%) linked to the 
S&P 500 Credit Risk 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The first half of this paper addressed the issues surrounding the riskiness of 
structured products. Systemic risk, information asymmetry, and credit rating difficulty 
were highlighted as the three major risks associated with financial innovation throughout 
history, and notably during the crisis of 2008. After applying those three risks to 
structured products, I determined that structured products did not pose a great risk to 
financial markets. Systemic risk is currently nonexistent due to the relatively small size of 
the market, and credit rating difficulty only applies as it pertains to the risk of the 
financial institution which issued the note. The presence of information asymmetry is 
concerning due to the inherent complexity of the products, but is not enough to condemn 
the industry. Rather, firms should (and probably do) recognize that increased information 
could lead to growth of the market for structured products. 
 Now that the reverse exchangeable and the upturn note have been examined in 
detail, it is time to answer the primary question about the structured product market’s 
effect on social welfare. It is not enough to simply say that structured products do not 
jeopardize the future of the financial system. Rather, a full justification of the market’s 
existence needs to highlight specific ways it bolsters the health of the financial system 
and stimulates economic growth. By applying the information presented in the two 
structured product case studies to the four economic functions of financial markets 
presented in Chapter 2, I will highlight specific ways the market for structured products 
accomplishes that goal. In addition, I will place structured products on Robert Litan’s 
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table entitled “Scoring Net Impacts of Recent Financial Innovations: A Summary.” This 
table is a major component of his paper entitled “In Defense of Some, But Not All, 
Financial Innovation,” and structured products are conspicuously absent from his ratings. 
5.1 The economic functions of financial markets 
The four economic functions of financial markets are enabling parties to pay each 
other, mobilizing society’s savings, channeling those savings towards productive 
investments, and allocating financial risks to those most willing and able to bear them. 
The field of structured products accomplishes the latter three goals, and has a neutral 
effect on enabling parties to pay each other. An example of this type of financial 
innovation could be ATM machines or credit cards, which offer buyers easier methods of 
making payments or sellers easier methods of getting paid. The field of structured 
products does not contribute in any way to this goal. 
 As illustrated by the upturn note and the reverse exchangeable note, structured 
products is an extremely productive method of mobilizing society’s savings. By virtue of 
their purchasing of structured products, investors are expressing the belief that structured 
products are their preferred method of allocating a portion of their savings. In the case of 
the reverse exchangeable, an investor who had a neutral outlook on Alcoa would not be 
able to financially express that view. Before the advent of structured products, such an 
investor would have to place their money elsewhere or possibly hold onto their money in 
cash. The same can be said for the upturn note. While many ETFs, mutual funds, and 
indexes track the growth of the U.S. stock market in some form, no other investment 
opportunity carries the specific risk profile of Citigroup’s S&P 500 upturn note. Without 
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access to the structured product market, the upturn note investors would be stuck with an 
instrument which was a less precise reflection of their risk preference regarding the S&P 
500. 
 A similar story can be told for the third economic mechanism of financial 
markets, which is channeling savings towards productive investments. In addition to 
providing notes based on anticipated need, structurers can design products based on the 
inquiries of investors. In other words, structured notes are frequently built to meet the 
exact needs of an investor. Depending on individual circumstances and current market 
conditions, those needs are infinite and constantly changing. While the term “productive 
investments” is open to interpretation, the reality is that the field of structure products 
enables investors to handpick the products and risk they desire. As the market grows and 
becomes more competitive, these products will undoubtedly become even more 
productive. 
 Structured products accomplish the fourth economic goal of financial markets 
perfectly. Every individual transaction within the structuring and ultimate sale of a note 
allocates financial risks to those most willing and able to bear them. In the case of the 
upturn note, Citigroup engaged in three separate transactions in the options market which 
allowed risk to be transferred between parties with different desires for risk and 
insurance, at a price which satisfied both parties in the transaction. In addition, Citigroup 
then bundled the options together into the S&P 500 upturn note and sold the product to 
investors who desired triple upside exposure to the U.S. stock market. As part of this 
transaction, the investors lent $35.2 million to Citigroup which the company invested in 
unknown markets and projects. The reverse exchangeable accomplished the same goals. 
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Risk was traded via the options market, and the products were together into a note which 
allowed investors to take on the risk of a drop in Alcoa’s stock in exchange for fixed 
coupon payments. Structured products are an excellent mechanism for allocating risks to 
those most willing and able to bear them, and overall an effective mechanism for 
increasing social welfare. 
5.2 Scoring the net impact of structured products 
 Robert Litan’s “In Defense of Much, But Not All, Financial Innovation” ranks 
recent financial innovation in terms of enhanced access and improved distributional 
welfare, user convenience, and impact on productivity/GDP. He highlights his findings in 
the table below, neglecting to address structured products. Each form of financial 
innovation is rated on a scale from double negative (--) to double positive (++), and my 
rating for structured products has been inserted in red. 
                         Table 1: Scoring Net Impacts of Recent Financial Innovations 
         Access       Convenience             Productivity/GDP 
Payments 
ATMs     ++   ++    + 
Credit card expansion  ++   ++    + 
Debit cards    ++   ++   + 
Saving 
Money market funds   ++  ++   0 
Indexed mutual funds  ++   ++   + 
Exchange-traded funds  +   +   0/+ 
Limited partnerships 
Hedge Funds   0   0    0/+ 
Private Equity  0   0    + 
TIPS     ++   ++   0/+ 
Investment 
Credit scoring   ++   ++   0 
ARMs     ++   N/A+   -/-- 
Home Equity Lines of 
Credit    ++   ++   - 
Asset-backed securities  ++   ++   -/+  
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CDOs*    ++   ++   -- 
SIVs*     ++   ++    -- 
Rise of Venture   +   +    ++  
(but future Capital not clear) 
Risk-Bearing 
Options/Futures Exchanges 
And Pricing   +   +    +/++ 
Interest/Currency Swaps  ++   ++    +/++ 
Credit default swaps   +   +    + 
Structured Products  +  0   ++ 
*The positive scores here were temporary 
 I assigned a “+” ranking to structured products in terms of access because the 
market increases the access to the options market, but the products themselves are not 
accessible to everyone due to the steep learning curve and market complexity. For 
example, the reverse exchangeable allowed investors indirect access to the exotic options 
market with the inclusion on the knock-in put and the knock-in call. Without structured 
products, these retail investors would probably never participate in any trading of exotic 
options. In that way, access to markets is improved. However, I chose not to give 
structured products a “++” because the market is not truly accessible to everyone. 
Structured products are not an avenue to make small investments, and the quantitative 
nature of the notes makes them almost unmarketable to untrained investors. One way this 
problem can be lessened is through financial advisors, but overall the market could be 
more accessible. 
 ‘Convenient’ is not the word most associated with structured products. The notes 
are bulky and illiquid, and require individual attention and structuring. In addition, the 
industry would be difficult to standardize, so it is difficult to picture the market becoming 
any more convenient in the near future. Accordingly, I awarded a neutral “0” to 
structured products in terms of convenience. 
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 As discussed earlier in this chapter, structured products are a driver of increased 
productivity and increased GDP. The industry mobilizes savings, channels the savings 
towards appropriate investments, and distributes risk to those most willing and able to 
bear it. All these aspects serve to raise investment levels, productivity, and GDP. For 
these reasons, I awarded structured products a “++” in terms of productivity. 
5.3 Summary 
 Structured products increase social welfare. While the market contains similar 
risks to other forms of financial innovation, the net impact is decidedly positive based on 
the increased productivity. The market optimally mobilizes society’s savings based on 
specific needs, and allows average investors to gain access to traditional inaccessible 
markets via structured notes. The market should continue to be monitored as it grows, as 
standardization will prove difficult, if not impossible. However as discussed in Akerlof 
(1970), the market will benefit from increased growth and publicity which will remove 
some of the problems of information asymmetry. The more investors that are comfortable 
with structured products, the more the market will grow. 
 The two major complaints about structured products being overcomplicated and 
overpriced are outdated and irrelevant. While the market is indeed complicated and 
quantitative, the industry serves to benefit from breaking down problems of asymmetric 
information. Deliberate complication could discourage investors and lead to market 
disappearance. In regards to overpricing, Bergstresser (2008) states “there were very 
large premia between 2000 and 2004, and much smaller premia in the period since.” The 
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growth of the structured product market since 2008 would suggest that premia have only 
continued to decrease as the market has become more competitive.  
 As has been discussed heavily in this paper, structured products possess the 
inherent potential to cause harm mainly as a result of asymmetric information. However, 
current structured product regulation policies do an excellent job of promoting the flow 
of information without stifling the market for structured products. All products issued in 
the United States are registered with the SEC and contain legal disclaimers and 
descriptions of potential risk. Because the individual products are so different from one 
another, these filings solve many of the problems which arise from a lack of 
standardization. By having these regulatory and filing mandates in place, firms are 
protected from lawsuits and investors benefit from increased information. While the 
popular media has been calling for increased financial regulation particularly in regards 
to engineered products, such policies would not improve the structured products market. 
The quantitative nature of the products cannot be solved by regulation. Individual 
investors are responsible for making the decision on whether they are prepared to enter 
the structured product market. For this reason, many pension funds and the like choose 
not to invest in structured products. 
 I see the structured products market continuing to grow rapidly in the future, and 
continuing to benefit social welfare. The field is relatively immune to market swings, 
because products can be structured in any environment. While the field will struggle with 
becoming standardized, growth and widespread investment will increase understanding 
of structured products and decrease information issues. Having assessed both the risks 
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and the benefits of the market, I conclude that structured products increase social welfare 
by way of improved market access and economic growth. 
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